And what about Pakistan?

Questions:

1. Eight years after military defeat in Afghanistan is Taleban a strong adversary again - now even a visible force in Pakistan. Taking in consideration the history of the wars in the region, do you think it is possible to defeat Taleban definitely in near future (+-10 years)? Or is the only real possibility for peace in the region to try to appeal to moderate elements of Taleban and find a way of coexistence?

2. The US are openly talking about not succeeding in Afghanistan without Pakistani help in fighting the Taleban and bringing order to tribal border regions. Is Pakistan capable of that? What can the Pakistani government really do?

3. There are some opinions that since 2001 Taleban radicalized and is even more influenced by the Al Qaeda that is still active in the region. How true do you think is this statement?

Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College

1. Yes, I think defeating the Taliban is possible, but the Taliban can only be defeated by the Afghans themselves, not by the international forces. To defeat an insurgent like the Taliban, the population must take an active part in rejecting the Taliban sanctuary in their local community.

2. The challenge for the Pakistani government is immense, so for them to actively defeating the Pakistani Taliban they must reallocate forces from the Indian focus, and use them for the internal challenge. Also, the Pakistani government must recreate the trust between the general population and the Pakistani government, so the civilian population will support the Pakistani government in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban.

3. The Taliban in Afghanistan is not to be seen as a unified actor that can be put into a western understanding of a hierarchical organisation. Some elements in the eastern and southern parts of the country are in contact with Al Qaeda, but a large part of the much localised insurgency groups act more or les independently and do not want interference by the foreign Al Qaeda elements. So yes Al Qaeda is still active in the region in especially the Pakistani border region to Afghanistan, but a large part of the Afghan Taliban insurgency is acting without Al Qaeda.

James Revill, Researcher at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

1. I think it is useful to think of the Taliban as not only a military force but a reactionary ideology which is strengthened by what is perceived as Foreign interferences in Central and Southern Asia, this is further hardened by the lack of socio economic opportunities for may in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan. In this sense a military victory could destroy the infrastructure and existing leadership and to some extent "defeat" the Taliban, however we need to look at drivers of the Taliban recruitment i.e. ideological factors in order to be able defeat the Taliban. Peace deals have been tried time and time again the FATA often allowing the Taliban to regroup before coming back into the fight better placed to engage the security forces of Pakistan (or the US). It is also notable that despite the rifts in the structure of leadership it has been argued the Taliban are not as divided as presumed and in this sense I am not sure whether a moderate Taliban exists. Yet despite these factors I think there has to be some form of engagement with the Taliban at some stage in the future even if this is not publicly known, I say this only because I fear continued violence will generate a hydra complex where the death of one motivates others (family members/friends) to take up the struggle or at the very least causes further grievance.

2. The US do indeed need genuine Pakistani support if they are to be able to leave AfPak with any semblance of a "victory". However Pakistan has historically been reluctant to engage the Taliban in part because they represent the evolution of a longstanding collective brothers in arms, coreligionists with a shared ethnic background (Pashtun), but also because they are a vehicle for achieving strategic depth in Afghanistan in the event of a conflict with India. Arguably the Pak military seems to be going ahead much more aggressively taking on militants in Swat, however it remains to be seen whether it has completely given up on its longstanding ally in the form of the Taliban. Moreover, if it is going to tackle the underlying drivers of Taliban recruitment it will be essential that military actions is followed up by social and economic development support provided by the government. The failure to do so could generate a space wherein religious groups would be the primary providers of aid, giving them greater legitimacy in the eyes of many.

3. I think the bombings of areas in the FATA which have resulted in significant civilian losses, combined with a government in Pakistan that is widely perceived as corrupt and ineffective coupled with widespread disillusionment in Pakistan all contribute to the process of pushing people away from moderate politics. Certainly polls by the Terror Free Tomorrow suggested that Pakistani attitudes to Al Qaeda were becoming more favourable than those of Bush or even Musharraf, in 2007 the TFT suggested: Nearly three quarters of Pakistanis oppose unilateral American military action to pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters based inside Pakistan. Moreover, a third or more of Pakistanis have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and bin Laden. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is also the least popular political leader in Pakistan today (38% favorable)-falling considerably behind bin Laden (46% favorable). See http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/template.php?section=PL

However the election process appears to have changed this: Pakistani public support for Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Bin Laden and other radical Islamist groups has dropped by half. TFT's previous nationwide survey across Pakistan in August 2007 (also conducted with D3 and PIPO) showed that anywhere from a third to one-half of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of Al Qaeda and related radical Islamist groups. Those numbers have now plummeted to the teens.

It is difficult to determine the accuracy of such Polls however it is also of note that Bin Laden is easy to create a legend around. He was rich but rejected (or was forced to reject) wealth in favour of what can be projected as a much more noble existence. Indeed, with enough spin and twisting Bin Laden can be presented as a modern day Robin Hood type character which can be used as a magnet. I should note i don't think he is a Robin Hood character, but it is easy to see how he can be portrayed like this and it matters in terms of generating support.

Shuja Nawaz, Director of the South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council of the United States

1. Fighting the domestic Taliban is only addressing the symptoms. Pakistan can win the battle by using the military to create space and time for the civilians to provide security to the population through improved police forces and provision of services and employment. In FATA (the border region) they only need to provide 300,000 jobs to the unemployed male youth group. This can be done with heavy infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges and small dams. That is how they can "win" over the majority moderate population. Swat has a moderate majority anyway. By ceding space to the Taliban through the ill-conceived deal, the provincial and central governments gave them the territory on a platter. Now they are paying for that error.

2. Pakistan is capable of solving this problem. It requires some bold actions: integrating FATA into Pakistan, economically and politically, and investing in creating jobs for the youth. So long as the US and collation forces continue to fight in Afghanistan, it helps recruitment of the afghan Taliban inside Pakistan.

3. Al Qaeda and "foreigners" have introduced violence and an extreme form of "salafist" Islam into the region. Some militants groups of the Pakistani Taliban and Punjabi Sunni extremists have loose franchise links to Al Qaeda. Otherwise Al Qaeda seems to have been weakened. Enough to have been unable to launch any major operation of its own. The Taliban are a homegrown operation with local aims and objectives. Not global Jihad.

Andrew Legon, Research Analyst at Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies

1. The Taliban have witnessed a stunning resurgence in recent years, demonstrated by rising number of clashes between insurgent forces and the coalition, an expanded sphere of influence beyond its traditional Pashtun area of support, and a growing list of Afghan population, security forces and international casualties. The rise of what has been termed the neo-Taliban is not all that surprising considering the international community has failed to plough enough diplomatic, financial and military energy into the mission.

The Taliban should not be underestimated; they are a formidable force. Their strength lies not in military proficiency however, despite the rising number of international coalition casualties. Conventional armed strength is rarely the hallmark of a successful insurgency. They are not strong enough to defeat international and Afghan security forces.

Defeat of the Taliban is possible, but not with the approach followed by the Bush administration. There is no military solution to this conflict. President Obama’s ‘new’ AfPak strategy was therefore a belated opportunity to adopt a different and necessary approach to the conflict. Despite his rhetoric of change, unfortunately the main contours of the strategy are in many ways depressingly familiar, framed in an overly militarised, counter-terrorism mind-set as is clear from his vow to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” the terrorist al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Take for example the Afghan National Police. Policing is one of the most effective counterinsurgency tools, but not in the way the United States currently conceptualises. Police are a bridge between the public and the government, but the ANP have been repeatedly used as a paramilitary supplement to the Afghan National Army whereas the force should be engaged in policing duties to ensure the safety or society and reduce crime thereby legitimising the central government and undermining the legitimacy of the Taliban as providers of security and governance. The strategy subsumes the ANP under the term, Afghan Security Forces, a semantic manoeuvre linking the ANP with the ANA rather than drawing connections between reform of the ANP with rule of law institutions. Justice is the key to the success of the government; indeed the Taliban rose to power in 1996 promising justice and security after years of warlord violence and chaos. Without a focus on rule of law development and broader socio-economic development, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that the Afghan military is built, trained and equipped to the point where the insurgency is manageable rather than defeatable.

Calls for a political solution to the conflict, appealing to moderate elements of the Taliban, have grown louder over the past year, particularly from top military commanders such as General Petraeus. In March it was widely reported that Obama highlighted the success of the US strategy of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq and suggested a similar approach could be attempted in Afghanistan. The inclusion of former insurgents into the current government has indeed already occurred. The Afghan government’s Peace and Reconciliation Commission has successfully attracted former insurgents with the promise of jobs and land. Higher profile Taliban have also been tempted to switch sides. Mawlawi Mohammed Islam Mohammadi, former governor of Bamyan Province under the Taliban was elected to the Afghan parliament in 2005. Such tactics have been used successfully in a number of successful counter-insurgency campaigns, Malaya most famously. There are numerous problems however, not least the question of who actually constitutes a moderate Taliban. It seems that rather than moderate Taliban, the question is enticing moderate insurgents, i.e. those who are not driven by ideological and radical jihadist sentiments.

2. Arguments that focus on Pakistan as the key to solving Afghanistan are overblown. Pakistan is undoubtedly a factor in the success or failure in Afghanistan. Afghanistan shares a long, porous border with Pakistan (the Durand Line) which is a border on
Obama's AfPak strategy recognises the manifest links between the insurgency in Afghanistan and developments in its neighbour but is not without its own problems.

The U.S. is right to talk about not succeeding in Afghanistan without Pakistani help. The Taliban’s resurgence was in part a product of the opportunities to regroup, plan and retrain offered by safe havens in Pakistan. The U.S. cannot send troops into Pakistan’s territory to pursue Taliban who have slipped across the border and into Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, such action would be politically explosive, radicalising Pakistani society and dangerously undermining the legitimacy of the central government in Islamabad. And yet drone attacks cannot achieve the desired results either; witness the backlash and fury of Pakistan society at U.S. drone attacks.

Pakistan’s help is therefore necessary, yet far from assured. Pakistan has always been a rather troublesome ally in the War on Terror. Despite rising casualties in Pakistan and creeping Talibanisation spreading from the border regions near Afghanistan to former tourist destinations in the Swat valley Links between certain elements in the Pakistani army and ISI are well documented and many have criticised fighting what they see as America’s or NATO’s War. To ensure Pakistani help in combating the Taliban it is essential that a regional approach to the problem is adopted, this must include India. However, while security dynamics on the subcontinent are in a state of flux, international relations on the sub-continent remain trapped by old thinking. Pakistan still looks to its historic enemy India, even as the Taliban invaded Buner district just 60km from Islamabad. Hence why the vast majority of Pakistan’s military forces were concentrated on the border with India.

Alarmed by the progress of Taliban into Buner district, in recent weeks public and official opinion appears to be galvanising against the threat. The recent offensive by the Pakistan military against Taliban in the Swat valley has been welcome by many in the international community. But the Pakistani army is not well-trained or equipped for the sort of counter-insurgency approach required. Military aid to Pakistan has been squandered on conventional armed forces geared towards its historic enemy of India. As such the approach used by the Pakistani army to counter the Taliban will be like that of a hammer to crack a nut. The main losers in this conflict already appear to be the civilian population, so many of whom are already refugees in their own country.