It never happened of course. But what if NATO and Warsaw Pact would collide? Read the comments of few experts.

Questions:

1. In the case of the conventional warfare between NATO and WAPA (or if you like with Soviet bloc armies as WAPA was created in 1955) who would be the winner and why? Does the outcome differ if we look at the various time periods 50’s, 60’ etc… and how would you describe the strongest and weakest points on both sides?

2. Is it possible to say where would be the main battlefield in the case of the conventional war?

3. NATO was created as the alliance based on the collective defense. Was there during the Cold War any serious discussion in the alliance about the preventive strike against the Eastern countries? If yes (probably it was more about the possibility of nuclear strike) what was the trigger for such discussion?

4. NATO was also involved in the “stay-behind” operations as for example Operation Gladio to counter possible Soviet invasion. Would you say those activities were useful or mainly they were toys of intelligence agencies?

Answers:

Lawrence Kaplan, Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University and Director Emeritus of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Union Studies at Kent State University

1. While the Soviets had the advantage of superior ground forces in the 1950’s, they were offset by US superiority in nuclear power until the very end of the decade. In the sixties there was a stand-off as both the US and USSR recognized the dangers of mutual destructions. Note Cuban missile crisis, Soviet retreat over Berlin, and a US diverted by Vietnam in the 1960’s

2. Main battlefield in 1950's and 60's expected to be Germany, although the Italian military was convinced that the Gorizia gap was as vulnerable as the Fulda gap.

3. I have never found evidence of a preventive strike plans. The McNamara strategy was to have sufficient strength to survive a Soviet ICBM first strike to strike back effectively. Presumably this would inhibit the Soviets.

4. The Gladio scandal in Italy in the 1990’s set in motion the notion of a massive conspiracy by Western intelligence agencies working with neofascist groups to take over resistance after Soviet occupation. Swiss historian Daniel Gansler develops this thesis. I found too many holes in it. I like your phrase, "tools of intelligence agencies." I suspect the subject was widely discussed but not acted on. Brussels Norwegian historian Olav Riste did call its absence from the archives a "black hole".

David Isby, political and defense analyst, autor of many books and articles on military and security

1. This, of course, would never have been known. Conventional war was really not feasible until the soviet policy changes post-1967. In the 1979’s and 1980’s, the Soviet investments in theater forces under Brezhnev – the cause of much of their economic disaster – was aimed to give them a capability to fight and win before the nuclear threshold was reached. While, in the 1980’s, the US and to lesser extent Germany and other members improved their conventional capabilities, it was only with Gorbachev that the threat began to fade.

2. The plan was that the battle would be fought near the inner German border. To the extent that the Warsaw Pact could have penetrated and fought a large-scale battle of maneuver further to the west – reminiscent of the great battles of the eastern front of 1943-45 – it would have been an advantage for the Soviets.

3. The Soviets became increasingly concerned with the preemption after the 1967 Middle East war. As a result, NATO became concerned with not taking steps that the Soviets would misinterpret as the preemptive strike. That is one reason why NATO never moved to battle positions along the inner German border.

4. If they could have worked and it there was an outside help – which the Polish civil war of 1944-49 lacked – yes it could have been effective. The Afghans were effective against the Soviets.

Jordan Baev, Associate Professor in International History and Senior Research Fellow in Security Studies at Rakovsky Defense and Staff College in Sofia

1. Until the end of 1960’s the strategic goals of the Warsaw Pact were based on nuclear-missile war. Only after the examination of both Middle East and Indochina wars the WP strategists started to use in their war game scenario the possibility of conventional wars, which reflected to NATO "local wars" strategy. Both WP and NATO argued officially on defensive counterattacks after first enemy blow. Of course, the scenarios insisted on "our final victory".

2. In the late 1940’s - early 195’s Central European and South East European (or Balkan) battlefields were counted as equal, because of the Truman Doctrine, Greek Civil War, and Stalin-Tito split. From the mid-1950s on Central European region was defined as a main battlefield.

3. Both NATO and WP presumed the possibility of a "preventive strike". In some way, it reflected in NATO "flexible response" strategic concept.

4. Gladio armies were well covered by Daniele Ganzer in his book. There were a lot of evidences as well during a parliamentary discussion in Italy. In the case of Turkey, during the so called "Antonov-Agca Case" in the early 1980-s, Bulgarian and East German State Security services collected many intelligence information regarding the close contacts between right wing Turkish Generals and Turkish Intelligence service (MIT) with the "Grey Wolves" terrorist nationalistic organization. In my view, Gladio armies were used more for internal political purposes i.e. to resist eventual "Communist penetration" inside Western Europe, and only secondary aim was their use in possible WP offensive.

Ingo Trauschweizer, military and diplomatic historian at European University Institute

In general terms, I would like to say that the possibility of war - limited or general - between NATO and WAPA forces in Europe was always extremely slim. From my perspective, US forces chose to prepare both for the sake of presenting a strong deterrent (war prevention) and preparedness (for defensive operations). I don't have enough expertise to address European armies specifically, but have seen evidence that the West German military was prepared to wage war for defensive purposes on the territory of East Germany.

As to your specific questions, the projected battle zone for NATO's Central Region (Germany, excluding Schleswig-Holstein, France, and the Benelux countries) ran from the Baltic coast to the Alps. Since my research focuses on American plans - note that NATO emergency defense plans remain classified and American plans are only available for the period from 1945 to the early 1950s - I can only state with confidence that US forces were prepared to operate in southern Germany and expected two lines of attack: one from the Thuringian Forest through the "Fulda Gap" toward Frankfurt and another from the CSSR through Bavaria and into Baden-Wuerttemberg. Recent studies by Vojtech Mastny suggest that the Soviet Union and its clients were more inclined to operate offensively in the North German Plain, where they would have been opposed by West German, British, Belgian, and Dutch forces (also Canadians until the Canadian Brigade was moved south). Beyond that, all would be speculation.

But as a teaser, I would point at a document generated by US European Command in the early 1950s that called for conventional operations from Germany and Italy/the Balkans against Poland and southeastern Europe, with a time span of more than one year before an invasion of the Soviet Union. But even those American generals tasked with writing it never took it seriously and that NATO and US commands in Europe never adopted it.

It is very unlikely that war in Europe would have remained conventional. NATO commanders, most prominently Lauris Norstad (SACEUR 1956-1962) hoped that initial conventional defense could cause the enemy to reconsider and enter into an armistice rather than risk general nuclear war. US Army philosophy went in the direction of "extended deterrence," i.e., initial conventional deterrence and defense followed by tactical nuclear weapons (still trying to prevent general nuclear war). But NATO did not have the capability to defend its territory by conventional means alone against a determined attack.

Western defenses were quite weak in the early 1950s, gained strength due to the deployment of five additional US Army divisions to Germany (for a total of about 6, including independent units) during the Korean War, were further shored up by the rearmament of West Germany - which eventually provided three corps for Central Region - and reached a certain sense of credibility by the early 1960s. Of course, soon thereafter, the Vietnam War and American force redeployments reduced NATO capabilities significantly and they only recovered in the late 1970s and 1980s. Ironically, NATO forces may have been at their strongest, if you consider technology, doctrine, and training instead of merely counting divisions and men, at the moment the Cold War in Europe ended.

I have not encountered any evidence for discussion of a preventive attack within NATO or the US or West German government agencies. I suspect that both alliances viewed themselves as defensive and the other as aggressive. That would fit with the general attitudes of the Cold War.

Winfried Heinemann, Director of research at the German Armed Forces’ Military History Institute in Potsdam

The Warsaw Pact disposed of the larger forces by far. However, internal coherence was not as tight as many Western analysts thought. The crises of 1953, 1956, 1968 and 1981 demonstrated that a substantial share of the WP military arsenal would have to be set aside for purposes of internal security. Any speculation about the outcome of a possible war is therefore just that - speculation.

Warsaw Pact military planning, right into the mid-1980s, provided for an immediate attack into Western Europe should military conflict begin. In this case, an attack on several axes would have developed from the GDR and from Czechoslovak territory, aiming in general to reach first the Rhine and then, eventually, the Atlantic Ocean. The main axis of threat in Central Europe (i.e. Germany and Denmark) would have been a push through North Germany to open the Baltic approaches, and a thrust through the "Fulda Gap" towards Frankfurt and the Rhine, dividing Germany into a Northern and a Southern half, opening the way to Paris, and blocking Bonn.

NATO was an alliance of 12, 15 and later 16 sovereign nations. The obligation to assist each other came into effect only in case of outside attack. To my knowledge, at no time would NATO cohesion have allowed for a preemptive or even preventive strike against the Warsaw Pact, nor even for intentionally offensive policies.

Whether any stay-behind operations would have had an effect on the overall course of a war, is also pure speculation.